Abstract. Many constructions based on multilinear maps require independent slots in the plaintext, so that multiple computations can be performed in parallel over the slots. Such constructions are usually based on CLT13 multilinear maps, since CLT13 inherently provides a composite encoding space, with a plaintext ring n i=1 Z/giZ for small primes gi's. However, a vulnerability was identified at Crypto 2014 by Gentry, Lewko and Waters, with a lattice-based attack in dimension 2, and the authors have suggested a simple countermeasure. In this paper, we identify an attack based on higher dimension lattice reduction that breaks the author's countermeasure for a wide range of parameters. Combined with the Cheon et al. attack from Eurocrypt 2015, this leads to the recovery of all the secret parameters of CLT13, assuming that low-level encodings of almost zero plaintexts are available. We show how to apply our attack against various constructions based on composite-order CLT13. For the [FRS17] construction, our attack enables to recover the secret CLT13 plaintext ring for a certain range of parameters; however, breaking the indistinguishability of the branching program remains an open problem.
Introduction
Multilinear maps. In 2013, Garg, Gentry and Halevi described the first plausible construction of cryptographic multilinear maps based on ideal lattices [GGH13a] . Since then many amazing applications of multilinear maps have been found in cryptography, including program obfuscation [GGH + 13b]. Shortly after the publication of GGH13, an analogous construction over the integers was described in [CLT13] , based on the DGHV fully homomorphic encryption scheme [DGHV10] . The GGH15 scheme is the third known family of multilinear maps, based on the LWE problem with encoding over matrices [GGH15] .
In the last few years, many attacks have appeared against multilinear maps, and the security of multilinear maps is still poorly understood. An important class of attacks against multilinear maps are "zeroizing attacks", which can recover the secret parameters from encodings of zero, using linear algebra. For the non-interactive multipartite Diffie-Hellman key exchange, the zeroizing attack from Cheon et al. [CHL + 15] recovers all secret parameters from CLT13; the attack can also be extended to encoding variants where encodings of zero are not directly available [CGH + 15] . The zeroizing attack from [HJ16] also breaks the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange over GGH13. Finally, the key exchange over GGH15 was also broken in [CLLT16], using an extension of the Cheon et al. zeroizing attack.
Even though direct multipartite key exchange protocols are broken for the three known families of multilinear maps, more complex constructions based on multilinear maps are not necessarily broken, in particular indistinguishability obfuscation (iO); namely low-level encodings of zero are generally not available in iO constructions. However the Cheon et al. attack against CLT13 was extended in [CGH + 15] to matrix branching programs where the input can be partitioned into three independent sets. The attack was further extended in [CLLT17] to branching programs without a simple input partition structure, using a tensoring technique. For GGH13 based obfuscation, Miles, Sahai and Zhandry introduced "annihilation attacks" that can break a certain class of matrix branching programs [MSZ16]; the attack was later extended in [CGH17] to break the [GGH + 13b] obfuscation under GGH13, using a variant of the input partitioning attack. Finally, Chen, Vaikuntanathan and Wee described in [CVW18] an attack against iO over GGH15, based on computing the rank of a well chosen matrix. In general, the above attacks only apply against branching programs with a simple structure, and breaking more complex constructions (such as dual-input branching programs) is currently infeasible.
Multilinear maps with independent slots. Many constructions based on multilinear maps require independent slots in the plaintext, so that multiple computations can be performed in parallel over the slots when evaluating the multilinear map. For example, [GLW14] and [GLSW15] use independent slots to obtain improved security reductions for witness encryption and obfuscation. Multilinear maps with independent slots were also used in the circuit based constructions of [AB15, Zim15] . The construction from [FRS17] , which gives a powerful technique for preventing zeroizing attacks against iO, is also based on multilinear maps with independent slots. The CLT13 multilinear map scheme inherently supports a composite integer encoding space, with a plaintext ring Z/GZ n i=1 Z/g i Z for small secret primes g i 's and G = g 1 · · · g n . For example, in the construction from [FRS17] , every branching program works independently modulo each g i . In that case, the main difference with the original CLT13 is that the attacker can obtain encodings of subring elements which are zero modulo all g i 's except one; for example, in [FRS17] this would be done by carefully choosing the input so that all branching programs would evaluate to zero except one. Whereas in the original CLT13 construction, one never provides encodings of subring elements; instead one uses an "all-or-nothing" approach: either the plaintext element is zero modulo all g i 's, or it is non-zero modulo all g i 's (with high probability).
The attack and countermeasure from [GLW14] . At Crypto 2014, Gentry, Lewko and Waters observed that using CLT13 with independent slots leads to a simple lattice attack in dimension 2, which efficiently recovers the (secret) plaintext ring n i=1 Z/g i Z [GLW14, Appendix B] . Namely, when using CLT13 with independent slots, the attacker can obtain encodings where all slots are zero modulo g i except one. For example, for a matrix branching program evaluation as in [FRS17] , the result of the program evaluation could have the form:
where m i = 0 for all i except m j = 0 for some 1 ≤ j ≤ n. This implies:
and therefore g j · A(x) mod x 0 is "small" (significantly smaller than x 0 ). Since g j is very small, we can then recover g j using lattice reduction in dimension 2, while normally the g i 's are secret in CLT13. Moreover, once we know g j , we can simply multiply the evaluation by g j to obtain a "small" result, even if the evaluation of the branching program is non-zero modulo g j ; in particular, this cancels the effect of the protection against input partitioning from [FRS17] . The countermeasure considered in [GLW14, Appendix B] is to give many "buddies" to each g i , so that we do not have a plaintext element which is non-zero modulo a single isolated g i . Then, either an encoding is 0 modulo g i and all its prime buddies g j , or it is (with high probability) non-zero modulo all of them. In other words, instead of using individual g i 's to define the plaintext slots, every slot is defined modulo a product of θ prime g i 's, for some 1 ≤ θ < n. Therefore, we obtain a total of n/θ plaintext slots (instead of n). While the above attack can be extended by multiplying A(x) by the θ corresponding g i 's, for large enough θ the right-hand side of the equation is not "small" anymore and the attack is thwarted.
Our contributions. In this paper we identify an attack based on higher dimension lattice reduction that breaks the countermeasure from [GLW14, Appendix B] for a wide range of parameters, with significant impact on the security of CLT13 multilinear maps with independent slots. More precisely, our contributions are as follows:
1. Analysis of the attack from [GLW14]. Our first contribution is to provide a theoretical study of the above attack, in order to derive a precise bound on θ as a function of the CLT13 parameters (there was no explicit bound in [GLW14]), where θ is the number of primes g i 's for each plaintext slot. We argue that, when ν denotes the number of bits that can be extracted from zero-testing in CLT13, the 2-dimensional lattice attack requires:
where α is the bit size of the g i 's.
2. Breaking the countermeasure from [GLW14]. Our main contribution is to extend the 2-dimensional attack to break the countermeasure for larger values of θ. Our attack is based on higher dimension lattice reduction, by using a similar orthogonal lattice attack as in [NS99] for solving the hidden subset sum problem. In this extension, we use encodings {c j : 1 ≤ j ≤ } where the corresponding plaintexts have only θ non-zero components modulo the g i 's (instead of = 1 in the previous attack). Using a lattice attack in dimension + 1, we show that our attack requires the approximate condition 1 + 1 αθ < ν for the parameters. Therefore, for moderately large values of , we get the simpler condition:
αθ < ν which improves (1) by a factor 2.
In the same vein, we show how to further improve this condition by considering products of encodings of the form c j · d k for 1 ≤ j ≤ and 1 ≤ k ≤ d, where as previously, the plaintexts of the c j 's have only θ non-zero components modulo the g i 's. In that case, using a variant of the previous lattice attack (this time in dimension + d), the bound improves to:
The above bound also applies when a vector of zero-testing elements is available, instead of a single p zt . While the original attack from [GLW14] recovers the secret plaintext ring of CLT13, we additionally recover the plaintext messages {m j : 1 ≤ j ≤ } for the encodings {c j : 1 ≤ j ≤ }, up to a scaling factor. We provide in Section 4.5 the result of practical experiments. For the original parameters of [CLT13] , our attack takes a few seconds for θ = 40, and a few hours for θ as large as 160, while the original attack from [GLW14] only works for θ = 1. In summary, our attack is more powerful than the attack in [GLW14], as it additionally recovers secret information about the plaintext messages, moreover for much larger values of θ. Finally, we suggest a set of secure parameters for CLT13 multilinear maps that prevents our extended attack. For λ = 80 bits of security, we recommend to take θ ≥ 1789.
3. Recovering all the secret parameters of CLT13. For the range of parameters derived previously, we show how to combine our attack with the Cheon et al. 
The CLT13 Multilinear Map Scheme
We first recall the CLT13 multilinear map scheme over the integers [CLT13] . For n ∈ Z ≥1 , the instance generation of CLT13 generates n distinct secret "large" primes p 1 , . . . , p n of size η bits, and publishes the modulus x 0 = n i=1 p i . We let γ denote the bit size of x 0 ; therefore γ n · η. One also generates n distinct secret "small" prime numbers g 1 , . . . , g n of size α bits. The plaintext ring is composite, i.e. a plaintext is an element m = (m 1 , . . . , m n ) of the ring Z/GZ
be the multilinearity parameter. For k ∈ {1, . . . , κ}, an encoding at level k of the plaintext m is an integer c ∈ Z such that
for "small" random integers r i of bit size ρ. The random mask z ∈ (Z/x 0 Z) × is the same for all encodings. It is clear that two encodings at the same level can be added, and the underlying plaintexts get added in the ring Z/GZ. Similarly, the product of two encodings at level i and j gives an encoding of the product plaintexts at level i + j, as long as the numerators in (2) do not grow too large, i.e. they must remain smaller than each p i .
For an encoding at the last level κ, one defines the following zero-testing procedure. The instance generation publishes the zero-testing parameter p zt , defined by
where h i ∈ Z are "small" random integers of size n h bits. Given an encoding c at the last level κ, we compute the integer:
and we consider that c encodes the zero message if ω is "small" compared to x 0 . Namely, if
, and since the integers h i and r i are "small", the resulting ω will be "small" compared to x 0 .
More precisely, let ρ f be the maximum bit size of the noise r i in the encodings. Then the integers h i r i x 0 /p i have size roughly γ − η + n h + ρ f , and therefore letting
the integers h i r i x 0 /p i have size roughly γ − ν bits. Therefore, when m i = 0 for all i, the integer ω has size roughly γ − ν bits; whereas when m i = 0 for some i, we expect that ω is of full size modulo x 0 , that is γ bits. The parameter ν in (5) corresponds to the number of bits that can be extracted from zero-testing; namely from (4), the ν most significant bits of ω only depend on the plaintext messages m i , and not on the noise r i . Note that to get a proper zero-testing procedure, one needs to use a vector of n elements p zt ; namely with a single p zt there exist encodings c with m i = 0 while p zt · c is "small" modulo x 0 . In the rest of the paper, for simplicity, we mainly consider a single p zt , as it is usually the case in constructions over CLT13 multilinear maps. We refer to [CLT13, Section 3.1] for the setting of the parameters.
Basic Attack against CLT1with Independent Slots
Many constructions based on multilinear maps require independent slots in the plaintext, so that multiple computations can be performed in parallel over the slots when evaluating the multilinear map; see for example [GLW14, GLSW15] and [AB15, Zim15, FRS17] . The CLT13 multilinear maps inherently provide independent slots, as the plaintext ring is n i=1 Z/g i Z for small secret primes g 1 , . . . , g n . Therefore we can have independent computations performed over the n plaintext slots modulo g i ; for example, in the construction from [FRS17] , every branching program works independently modulo each g i .
The basic attack from [GLW14] . When using CLT13 with independent slots, the attacker can obtain encodings of plaintext elements where all slots are zero modulo g i except one. For example, in the [FRS17] construction where each branching program works modulo g i , the attacker can choose the input so that the resulting evaluation is 0 modulo all g i 's except one, say g 1 , without loss of generality. Let c be a level-κ encoding of a plaintext m = (m 1 , . . . , m n ) where m i = 0 for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n. From Equation (4) we obtain the following zero-testing evaluation:
This implies:
and therefore g 1 ·ω mod x 0 is significantly smaller than x 0 , as the integers h i and r i are "small". This implies that we can recover g 1 , and similarly the other g i 's using lattice reduction in dimension 2, while normally the g i 's are secret in CLT13. This eventually recovers the plaintext ring. We analyze the attack below.
The countermeasure from [GLW14]. The following countermeasure was therefore suggested by the authors: instead of using individual g i 's to define the plaintext slots, every slot is defined modulo a product of θ prime g i 's, where 2 ≤ θ < n. Therefore, a plaintext element cannot be non-zero modulo a single prime g i ; it has to be non-zero modulo at least θ primes g i 's. This gives a total of n/θ plaintext slots (instead of n); for simplicity we assume that θ divides n. Therefore, the original plaintext ring R = Z/g 1 Z×· · ·×Z/g n Z can be rewritten as R = n/θ j=1 R j , where for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n/θ, the subrings R j are such that R j θ i=1 Z/g (j−1)θ+i Z. We can assume that the attacker can obtain encodings of random subring plaintexts in R j for any 1 ≤ j ≤ n/θ. In that case, the attacker obtains an encoding c of m = (m 1 , . . . , m n ) ∈ R where m i ≡ 0 (mod g i ) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {(j − 1)θ + 1, . . . , jθ}. In that case we will say that m has non-zero support of length θ.
Analysis of the basic attack.
In this section we analyze in more details the attack from [GLW14], and we derive an explicit bound on the parameter θ, as a function of the other CLT13 parameters. Given an integer 1 ≤ θ < n (the above attack is obtained for θ = 1), we consider a message having non-zero support of length θ; that is, (without loss of generality) of the form m = (m 1 , . . . , m n ) ∈ Z n with 0 ≤ m i < g i such that m i = 0 for θ + 1 ≤ i ≤ n, i.e. we assume that the non-zero support of m is located in the first slot. We consider a top level κ encoding c of m, that is:
with integers r i of bit size ρ f . From zero-testing, we obtain from (4):
By multiplying out by g :
where
Since the integers h i and r i are "small" in order to ensure correct zero-testing, the integer U is "small" in comparison to x 0 . More precisely, the proposition below shows that if g · U is a bit smaller than x 0 , then we can recover g and U by lattice reduction in dimension 2. Proposition 1. Let g, ω, U ∈ Z ≥1 and x 0 ∈ Z ≥1 be such that gω ≡ U (mod x 0 ), ω ∈ (Z/x 0 Z) × and gcd(U, g) = 1. Assume that g · U < x 0 /10. Given ω and x 0 as input, one can recover g and U in polynomial time.
Proof. Without loss of generality we can assume g ≤ U , since otherwise we can apply the algorithm
When the bit size of g and U is unknown, such a B can be found by exhaustive search in polynomial time. We consider the lattice
Moreover, we have:
This implies that v < λ 2 (L) and therefore v is a multiple of a shortest non-zero vector in L: we write v = ku with u = λ 1 (L), and k ∈ Z\{0}. Letting u = (Bu 1 , u 2 ), we have g = ku 1 and U = ku 2 . Hence k divides both g and U . Since gcd(g, U ) = 1 one has k = ±1. This shows that v is a shortest non-zero vector of L. By running Lagrange-Gauss reduction on the matrix of row vectors:
, which enables to recover g and U .
Using the same notations as in Section 2, the integer g = θ i=1 g i has approximate bit size θ · α, while the integer U has an approximate bit size γ −η +n h +ρ f +θα. From the condition g ·U < x 0 /10 of Proposition 1, we obtain by dropping the term log 2 (10), the simplified condition
Writing as previously ν = η − n h − ρ f for the number of bits that can be extracted during zero testing, the attack works under the condition:
where α is the bit size of the g i 's. In the next section we describe a high-dimensional lattice reduction attack with an improved bound on θ.
An extended attack against CLT13 with Independent Slots
Outline of our new attack. Our new attack improves the bound on θ compared to the attack recalled in Section 3; it also enables to recover multiples of the underlying plaintext messages, instead of only the CLT13 plaintext ring. The main difference is that we work with several messages instead of a single one, using high-dimensional lattice reduction instead of dimension 2. Let ≥ 1 be an integer. Assume that we have level-κ encodings c j of plaintext elements m j = (m j1 , . . . , m jn ) for 1 ≤ j ≤ , where each message has non-zero support of length θ. Without loss of generality, we can assume that m ji = 0 for all θ + 1 ≤ i ≤ n and all 1 ≤ j ≤ . We consider the zero-testing evaluations ω j = p zt · c j mod x 0 of these encodings, which gives as previously:
for integers r ji . We can rewrite the above equation as:
for some integers α i , where for each evaluation ω j , the integer R j is significantly smaller than x 0 . We can see Equation (8) as an instance of a "noisy" hidden subset sum problem. Namely in [NS99] , the authors consider the following hidden subset sum problem. Given a positive integer M , and a vector
such that there exist vectors x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ Z with entries in {0, 1} satisfying:
In our case, the weights α 1 , . . . , α n are hidden as in [NS99] , but for each equation we have an additional hidden noisy term R j . Moreover, the weights α i = h i · (g −1 i mod p i ) · x 0 /p i have a special structure, instead of being random in [NS99] . Thanks to this special structure, using a variant of the orthogonal lattice approach from [NS99] , we can recover the secret product g = g 1 · · · g θ and the plaintext elements m ji up to a scaling factor.
Preliminaries on lattices
Let L be a lattice in R d of rank 0 < n ≤ d. We recall that Hadamard's Inequality gives the following upper bound on the determinant of L, for every basis B of L:
Based on Hadamard's Inequality, we prove the following simple lemma.
Lemma 2. Let 1 ≤ n ≤ d be integers and let L ⊆ Z d be a lattice of rank n. Let x 1 , . . . , x n−1 ∈ L be linearly independent. Then for every vector y ∈ L not in the linear span of x 1 , . . . ,
We recall that the LLL algorithm [LLL82], given an input basis of L, produces a reduced basis of L with respect to the choice of a parameter δ ∈ (1/4, 1); we call such a basis δ-reduced. More precisely, we will use the following theorem.
. Then the LLL algorithm with reduction parameter δ outputs a δ-reduced basis {b i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} after O(n 5 d log 3 B) operations. Moreover, the first vector in such a basis satisfies:
for every non-zero x ∈ L, and where c = 1/(δ − 1/4).
Our first lattice-based attack
Setting. In this section, we describe our first attack based on a variant of the hidden subset-sum problem. We consider plaintext elements m 1 , . . . , m ∈ Z n and write m ji for the i-th entry of the j-th message, where 0 ≤ m ji < g i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ . As previously, we assume that m ji = 0 for all θ + 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We write M for the matrix of row vectors m j for 1 ≤ j ≤ ; and we will denote its columns bym i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, that is, M = m 1 · · ·m n ∈ Mat ×n (Z). By construction, the vectorsm i for θ + 1 ≤ i ≤ n are all zero. We also assume that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ θ,
For 1 ≤ j ≤ , we let c j denote an encoding of m j at the last level κ:
where r ji ∈ Z are ρ f -bit integers. Letting c = (c j ) 1≤j≤ , this gives a vector equation over Z :
for r i = (r ji ) 1≤j≤ . Let p zt be the zero-testing parameter, as defined in (3). From zero-testing we obtain the following equations:
, where we use the shorthand notations:
and
As a vector equation, this reads:
with ω = (ω j ) 1≤j≤ ; for 1 ≤ i ≤ θ the vectorsm i are as above and
In the above equation, the components of R have approximate bit size ρ R = γ − η + n h + ρ f . Using, as previously, ν = η − n h − ρ f as the number of bits that can be extracted, we have therefore ρ R = γ − ν. As explained above, Equation (11) is similar to an instance of the hidden subset sum problem, so we describe a variant of the orthogonal lattice attack from [NS99] , which recovers the secret CLT13 plaintext ring and the hidden plaintexts {m i : 1 ≤ i ≤ θ}, up to a scaling factor. For the sequel, we assume that the prime numbers g 1 , . . . , g θ are distinct, and that for every
The orthogonal lattice L. We consider the lattice L of vectors (Bu, v) ∈ Z +1 , with u ∈ Z and v ∈ Z, such that (u, v) is orthogonal to (ω, 1) modulo x 0 , where B ∈ Z ≥1 is a scaling factor that will be determined later. Since L contains the sublattice x 0 Z +1 , it has full-rank + 1. We note that this lattice is known (i.e. we can construct a basis for it) since ω and x 0 are given. Our attack is based on the fact that L contains a rank-sublattice L , generated by reasonably short vectors {(Bu i , v i ) : 1 ≤ i ≤ } of L, which can be used to reveal the secret product g = θ i=1 g i . More precisely, for every (Bu, v) ∈ L, we obtain from (11):
and therefore, the vector ( u,m 1 , . . . , u,m θ , u, R + v) is orthogonal modulo x 0 to the vector a = (α 1 , . . . , α θ , 1). To obtain balanced components, we use another scaling factor C ∈ Z ≥1 and we consider the vector:
Following the original orthogonal lattice attack from [NS99] , if a vector (Bu, v) ∈ L is short enough, then the associated vector p u,v = (Cx, y) will also be short, and if (x, y) becomes shorter than a shortest non-zero vector orthogonal to a modulo x 0 , we must have p u,v = 0, which implies u,m i = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ θ. We will see that in our setting, because of the specific structure of the coefficients α i 's, we only get u,m i ≡ 0 (mod g i ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ θ. Therefore, by applying lattice reduction to L, we expect to recover the lattice Λ ⊥ of vectors u which are orthogonal to allm i modulo g i ; since by assumptionm i ≡ 0 (mod g i ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ θ, the lattice Λ ⊥ i = {u ∈ Z : u,m i ≡ 0 (mod g i )} has determinant g i , and since g 1 , . . . , g θ are distinct primes, the lattice
In particular, any basis for this lattice reveals g by computing its determinant.
The lattice A ⊥ . Henceforth, we must study the short vectors in the lattice of vectors orthogonal to a modulo x 0 . More precisely, we consider the lattice A ⊥ of vectors (Cx, y) ∈ Z θ+1 , such that (x, y) is orthogonal to a = (α 1 , . . . , α θ , 1) modulo x 0 ; therefore p u,v ∈ A ⊥ . The lattice A ⊥ has full-rank θ + 1 and we have det(A ⊥ ) = C θ x 0 . Namely, we have an abstract group isomorphism A ⊥ (CZ) θ ⊕ x 0 Z, sending (Cx, y) to (Cx, x, a + y).
As mentioned previously, the coefficients α i 's in the vector a have a particular structure. Namely, we have α i = (g −1 i mod p i )h i x 0 /p i , and therefore
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ θ. Therefore the lattice A ⊥ contains the θ linearly independent short vectors q i = (0, . . . , 0, Cg i , 0, . . . , 0, −s i ), where s i = h i · x 0 /p i . Using C := 2 ρ R −α , we get q i C · 2 α . We now derive a condition on p u,v so that the vector p u,v belongs to the sublattice of A ⊥ generated by the short vectors {q i : 1 ≤ i ≤ θ}. From Lemma 2, if p u,v < det(A ⊥ )/ θ i=1 q i , then p u,v must belong to the linear span generated by the q i 's; since by assumption, the g i 's are distinct primes and gcd(s i , g i ) = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ θ, this implies that it must belong to the sublattice generated by the q i 's. In that case, we have:
From det(A ⊥ ) = C θ · x 0 and q i C · 2 α , the previous condition p u,v < det(A ⊥ )/ θ i=1 q i gives the approximate condition:
Short vectors in L. We now study the short vectors of L; more precisely, we explain that L contains linearly independent short vectors of norm roughly 2 ρ R +αθ/ . We show that these vectors can be derived from the lattice Λ ⊥ of vectors u ∈ Z satisfying (12), i.e. that are orthogonal tom i modulo g i for every 1 ≤ i ≤ θ. This is a full-rank lattice of dimension and determinant g = θ i=1 g i , with g 2 αθ . Therefore, we heuristically expect that the lattice Λ ⊥ contains linearly independent vectors of norm roughly (det Λ ⊥ ) 1/ 2 αθ/ . We show that from any short u ∈ Λ ⊥ , we can generate a vector (u, v) with small v, and orthogonal to (ω, 1) modulo x 0 , and consequently a short vector (Bu, v) ∈ L. For this, we write u,m i = k i g i with k i ∈ Z, and we have:
2 ρ R u . In summary, the lattice L contains a sublattice L of rank , generated by vectors of norm roughly 2 ρ R +αθ/ . That the recovered vectors are indeed linearly independent is the content of the following lemma, which we prove in Appendix A.1. Recovering g = θ i=1 g i . By applying lattice reduction to the lattice L, we expect that the first vectors {(Bu j , v j ) : 1 ≤ j ≤ } of a reduced basis belong to the above sublattice L and have norm roughly:
where 2 ι( +1) is the Hermite factor for some positive constant ι depending on the lattice reduction algorithm. With C = 2 ρ R −α , we have
From the condition given by (13), we have that u i ∈ Λ ⊥ if p u i ,v i < 2 γ−α·θ ; therefore combining with (14) we get the approximate condition:
Using ρ R = γ −ν where ν is the number of bits that can be extracted from zero-testing, this condition becomes
In summary, when Condition (15) is satisfied, we expect to recover a basis {u i : 1 ≤ i ≤ } of the lattice Λ ⊥ ; then since det(Λ ⊥ ) = g = θ i=1 g i , the absolute value of the determinant of the basis matrix reveals g.
From Equation (15), we observe that the parameter can be kept relatively small (say 10), as larger values of would not significantly improve the bound; this implies that the lattice dimension + 1 on which LLL is applied can be kept relatively small. Moreover for LLL, experiments show that 2 ι 1.021 so that ι is approximately 0.03, and therefore for such small values of , the term ι · ( + 1) is negligible. Thus we can use the simpler approximate bound for our attack:
This gives a factor 2 improvement compared to the previous bound given by (7), following the attack of [GLW14]. In the next subsection we will see how to get a much more significant improvement, with αθ = O(ν 2 ).
A proven variant. The above algorithm is heuristic only. Below we describe a proven variant that can recover a vector u such that u,m i ≡ 0 (mod g i ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ θ, using the LLL reduction algorithm. Although we only recover a single vector u instead of a lattice basis, this will be enough when combined with the Cheon et al. attack to recover all secret parameters of CLT13 (see Section 5). We provide the proof of Proposition 5 in Appendix A.2.
Proposition 5. Let , θ ∈ Z ≥1 , x 0 ∈ Z ≥1 and let g i ∈ Z ≥2 be distinct α-bit prime numbers for
. Assume that
Given the integers , θ, ρ R , x 0 and the vector ω, one can recover in polynomial time a vector u ∈ Z such that u,m i ≡ 0 (mod
We remark that by replacing log 2 (x 0 )−ρ R by γ −ρ R = ν, we recover, up to additional logarithmic terms, the approximate bound established in (15).
Extended Orthogonal Lattice Attack
In this section we describe an extended attack that significantly improves the bound on θ established in (16). Let , d ≥ 1 be integers. As previously, we assume that we have encodings c j of plaintext elements m j = (m j1 , . . . , m jn ) for 1 ≤ j ≤ , where only the first θ components of each m j are non-zero, that is, m ji = 0 for θ + 1 ≤ i ≤ n. However, we assume that these encodings are at level κ − 1, and that we also have an additional set of d level-1 encodings {c k : 1 ≤ k ≤ d} of plaintext elements x k = (x k1 , . . . , x kn ) for 1 ≤ k ≤ d. By computing the top-level κ product encodings, we can therefore obtain the following zero-testing evaluations:
for some integers r jki . Since every encoding c j encodes a message with non-zero support of length θ, the product encodings c j c k maintain their zero slots. Note that the same remains valid if the encodings c j are at even lower levels, because they can be raised to level κ − 1 without removing their zero slots. As previously, we rewrite Equation (18) as:
where we let
As before, for 1 ≤ i ≤ θ, we denote bym i ∈ Z the vector with components m ji for 1 ≤ j ≤ , and similarly ω k and R k the corresponding vectors in Z . We assume thatm i ≡ 0 (mod g i ) for all i. The previous equation can then be rewritten as:
The difference with Equation (11) from our first lattice attack is that the vectors {m i : 1 ≤ i ≤ θ} now satisfy d equations for 1 ≤ k ≤ d, instead of a single equation, as in Subsection 4.2. With more constraints on the vectorsm i , we can therefore break the countermeasure from [GLW14] for much higher values of θ. In order to derive a condition on the parameters, we proceed as previously. Namely, the lattices that we considered in Subsection 4.2 now admit natural higher-dimensional analogues.
The orthogonal lattice L. As previously, for a scaling factor B ∈ Z ≥1 , we consider the lattice L of vectors (Bu, v) ∈ Z +d , with u ∈ Z and v ∈ Z d , such that (u, v) is orthogonal to the d vectors
and therefore the vector ( u,m 1 , . . . , u,m θ , u,
The lattice A ⊥ . In order to bound the norm of the vector p u,v , we must study the short vectors in the lattice of vectors orthogonal to the vectors a k modulo x 0 (instead of single vector a). As previously, we consider the lattice A ⊥ of vectors (Cx, y) ∈ Z θ+d such that (x, y) is orthogonal to the d vectors {a k : 1 ≤ k ≤ d} modulo x 0 ; therefore p u,v ∈ A ⊥ . The lattice A ⊥ has full-rank θ + d and determinant C θ x d 0 . As previously, the coefficients α ik in the vectors a k have a special structure, since they satisfy the congruence relations
Using C = 2 ρ R −α , we get as previously q i C · 2 α . We now derive a bound on p u,v so that p u,v belongs to the sublattice generated by the θ vectors {q i : 1 ≤ i ≤ θ}. We expect a reduced basis of A ⊥ to have the first θ vectors with approximately the same norm as the vectors {q i : 1 ≤ i ≤ θ}, and to have the last d vectors with norm
. This implies that, heuristically, if p u,v < U , then p u,v must belong to the sublattice generated by the θ vectors {q i : 1 ≤ i ≤ θ}. As previously, in that case we have that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ θ :
(20)
Short vectors in L. We now study the short vectors of L; as previously, we show that L contains linearly independent short vectors of norm roughly 2 ρ R +αθ/ , which can be derived from the the lattice Λ ⊥ of vectors u ∈ Z satisfying (20). Since, as previously, Λ ⊥ heuristically contains linearly independent vectors of norm roughly (det Λ ⊥ ) 1/ 2 αθ/ , the lattice L contains linearly independent vectors of norm roughly 2 ρ R +αθ/ . Therefore, by applying lattice reduction to the lattice L, we expect that the first vectors {(Bu i , v i ) : 1 ≤ i ≤ } of the basis have norm roughly:
where 2 ι( +d) is the Hermite factor. With B = 2 ρ R and C = 2 ρ R −α , we have p u i ,v i (Bu i , v i ) . From the condition p u i ,v i < U , we get the condition:
Remark that with d = 1 the previous bound gives Equation (15) . Since (21) is concave and symmetric in both and d, the optimum is to take = d. This gives the bound:
When the above condition is satisfied, as previously we expect to recover a basis {u i : 1 ≤ i ≤ } of the lattice Λ ⊥ . Then since det(Λ ⊥ ) = g = θ i=1 g i , the absolute value of the determinant of the basis matrix reveals g. In particular, it follows that the attack requires > 2αθ/ν, and we must have: ι < ν 2 4αθ Heuristically, achieving a Hermite factor of 2 ι2 requires 2 Ω(1/ι) using BKZ reduction with blocksize β = ω(1/ι), [HPS11] . The attack has therefore complexity 2 Ω(αθ/ν 2 ) ; the attack has therefore (heuristic) polynomial-time complexity under the condition:
which significantly improves our previous bound given by (16) . Conversely, one expects that the attack is prevented under the condition:
In Section 4.5 we provide concrete parameters for CLT13 multilinear maps with independent slots. We will see that Condition (23) requires a much higher value for θ than the condition 2θα ≥ ν for preventing the [GLW14] attack. Namely for λ = 80 bits of security, the bound 2θα ≥ ν already holds for θ = 2, while a concrete application of Condition (23) requires θ ≥ 1789.
Analogy of the attacks. We remark that our extended attacks share similarities with the 2-dimensional attack from Section 3. For , d ∈ Z ≥1 , our extended lattice attack works by reducing
where B ∈ Z ≥1 is fixed. With this notation, the three attacks work by reducing the lattices
For the extended attacks, the × top-left submatrix of a reduced basis of L ( ,d) (divided by B) has determinant ±g. Note that this coincides with the 2-dimensional case = d = 1: the first entry (divided by B) of the first vector in a reduced basis equals ±g (i.e. a "1 × 1 submatrix" of determinant ±g). As such, our higher-dimensional attacks are consistent generalizations of the 2-dimensional attack. Summary. We have described a lattice-based attack, which under the condition αθ = O(ν 2 ), and given as input a collection of encodings (or products of encodings) of messages with non-zero support of length θ, outputs the secret plaintext ring of CLT13. More precisely, our extended lattice attack with the improved bound αθ = O(ν 2 ) can be described in the following three steps, with parameters , d ≥ 1. We provide in https://pastebin.com/7WEMHBE9 the source code in Sage [S + 17].
Input: Sets of level-κ encodings {c j · c k mod x 0 : 1 ≤ j ≤ , 1 ≤ k ≤ d} where c j encodes a message of non-zero support of length θ.
2. Let B = 2 ρ R and compute a LLL-reduced basis of the lattice
Variant with multiple p zt . In many concrete constructions based on composite order multilinear maps, intermediate-level encodings of almost zero plaintexts are not necessarily available. We refer to Section 6 for the application of our attacks to concrete constructions. In order to get around this assumption, we consider a variant of the above attack, where we have multiple zero-testing elements p zt instead of a single one. Namely, as described in [CLT13] , in order to get a proper zero-testing procedure, one needs to use a vector of n elements p zt . We denote by p zt,k for 1 ≤ k ≤ n those zero-testing elements:
for corresponding integers h ik . As previously, we assume that we have encodings c j of plaintext elements m j = (m j1 , . . . , m jn ) for 1 ≤ j ≤ , where only the first θ components of each m j are non-zero, that is, m ji = 0 for θ + 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We can now assume that these encodings are at the last level κ. Thanks to the multiple zero-testing elements, we can therefore obtain the following zero-testing evaluations:
for some integers r jki , which is similar to (18) with h ik = h i · x ki . Therefore the same attack applies and the secret g = θ i=1 g i can be recovered in (heuristic) polynomial-time under the condition αθ = O(ν 2 ).
Revealing information about the plaintext elements
We show that our attack not only reveals the secret CLT13 plaintext ring, but also information about the secret plaintext elements {m i : 1 ≤ i ≤ θ}. Namely, the orthogonal lattice attack not only recovers g = θ i=1 g i , but also constructs a matrix U of rows {u j : 1 ≤ j ≤ } orthogonal to the vectors {m i : 1 ≤ i ≤ θ} modulo g i (i.e. a basis of the lattice Λ ⊥ , following the previous notation) and we can use this matrix U in order to recover scalar multiples of the plaintext vectors {m i : 1 ≤ i ≤ θ}.
More precisely, we show that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ θ, we can recover the one-dimensional linear space generated bym i modulo g i . The first step is to factor g = θ i=1 g i to recover the primes g i 's; this is feasible if the g i 's are small enough. 1 Since we have a basis matrix U of the lattice of vectors u with u,m i ≡ 0 (mod g i ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ θ, it suffices to compute the Z/g i Z-kernel of the × matrix U g i = U mod g i ; assuming thatm i ≡ 0 (mod g i ), we have that ker(U g i ) has dimension 1 over over Z/g i Z and therefore, we recover a non-trivial multiple λ imi of the original messagesm i modulo g i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ θ. With the ECM [Len87] the factorization of g = θ i=1 g i can be computed in time exp(c √ α ln α) for some positive constant c and where α is the bit size of the g i 's, which gives a sub-exponential time attack.
Alternatively, to avoid the factorization of g, we can compute the integer right kernel of the matrix [U | gI ], where I denotes the identity matrix in dimension . The following proposition shows that we can recover in polynomial time a non-trivial multiple of the vectorm, such that m ≡m i (mod g i ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ θ.
Proof. By the Chinese Remainder Theorem, there exists a unique vectorm ∈ Z ∩ [0, g) satisfyinĝ
This holds for all 1 ≤ i ≤ θ, so by the Chinese Remainder Theorem, ker(U g ) (where U g is the matrix U modulo g) is a free Z/gZ-module of rank 1, generated bym. In particular, there exists k ∈ Z such that (m, k) belongs to the Z-kernel of the matrix [U | gI ]. The integer kernel of this matrix can be computed in polynomial time from g and U and the left × submatrix of the Hermite normal form of the basis of the Z-kernel gives in the first row a vector λm with λ ∈ (Z/gZ) × .
Concrete parameters and practical experiments
Concrete parameters. We provide concrete parameters for CLT13 multilinear maps with independent slots, for various values of the security parameter λ. We start from the same concrete parameters as provided in [CLT13] ; we assume that the encoding noise is set so that the number of extracted bits is ν = 2λ + 12; we take α = λ. We then provide the minimum value of θ that ensures the same level of security against lattice attacks; see Table 1 . As in [CLT13] , the goal is to ensure that the best attack takes at least 2 λ clock cycles.
While in Table 1 the number of independent slots n slots = n/θ appears to be relatively small, it is always possible to increase the number of independent slots by increasing the value of n. Table 2 . Running time of our LLL-based attack, as a function of the parameter θ, for the "Extra" parameters of CLT13. The lattice dimension is + d = 2 .
5 Application to the Cheon et al. Attack 
The original Cheon et al. attack with encodings of zero
We first recall the basic Cheon et al. attack against CLT13. For simplicity, we take κ = 3; the attack is easily extended to κ > 3. Consider a set A = {a j : 1 ≤ j ≤ n} of encodings of zero at level one, a pair B = {b 0 , b 1 } of encodings at level one, and a set C = {c k : 1 ≤ k ≤ n} of encodings at level one. We write
for all 1 ≤ j, i, k ≤ n and t ∈ {0, 1}. We obtain the zero-testing evaluations:
where the equality holds over Z because the products a j b t c k are level-3 encodings of 0. This can be written in matrix form as
jk ) 1≤j,k≤n for t ∈ {0, 1}, one obtains the integer matrix equalities W t = A∆ t C for t ∈ {0, 1}, where the rows of A are the vectors (a j1 , · · · , a jn ) j , the columns of C are the vectors (c k1 , · · · , c kn ) k , and ∆ t is the diagonal matrix diag(b t1 p zt,1 , . . . , b tn p zt,n ).
Provided that at least one of W 0 , W 1 is invertible over Q (say W 1 ), one then evaluates over Q the matrix product:
The attacker can thus compute the eigenvalues of W 0 W −1 1 , by factoring the characteristic polynomial (over Q). By similarity of these matrices, these eigenvalues coincide with those of ∆ 0 ∆ −1 1 = diag(b 01 /b 11 , . . . , b 0n /b 1n ), which are {b 0i /b 1i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. These ratios are now enough to factor x 0 . Namely, writing the quotients b 0i /b 1i = x i /y i for coprime integers x i , y i and using that b t ≡ b ti /z (mod p i ), we obtain:
and therefore gcd(x i b 1 − y i b 0 , x 0 ) = p i with good probability. In summary, the Cheon et al. attack recovers all secret p i 's in polynomial time given the low-level encodings of zero {a j : 1 ≤ j ≤ n}.
Adaptation of the Cheon et al. attack to our cryptanalysis
We now show how to adapt the Cheon et al. attack when no encodings of zero are available, but the attacker can obtain low-level encodings where only θ components of the underlying plaintexts are non-zero. The attack is divided in two steps: first the attacker generates encodings of zero using the orthogonal lattice attack from Section 4, and then applies the original Cheon et al. attack to reveal the primes {p i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
We consider the following setting with κ = 4. Let ≥ 1; we consider a set Y = {y j : 1 ≤ j ≤ } of level-one encodings of messages m 1 , . . . , m where only the first θ components of each m j are nonzero. Moreover, we consider as in the previous section three sets A = {a j : 1 ≤ j ≤ n}, B = {b 0 , b 1 } and C = {c k : 1 ≤ k ≤ n} of level-one encodings of non-zero messages.
First step: orthogonal lattice attack. We show that the orthogonal lattice attack from Section 4.2 can compute a short vector u ∈ Z such that y = u, y is a level-1 encoding of zero, where y = (y 1 , . . . , y ). We write for all 1 ≤ j ≤ :
with the usual CLT13 notations, where m ji = 0 for θ + 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Note that our orthogonal lattice attack from Section 4.2 uses level-κ encodings; therefore it can be applied on level-κ encodings of the form:
for level-one encodings a 1 , b 0 , c 1 ; we obtain:
for some r ji ∈ Z and where x i is the i-th component of the plaintext corresponding to the encoding a 1 · b 0 · c 1 . Clearly, since the messages {m j : 1 ≤ j ≤ } have non-zero support of length θ, the messages {(m ji · x i ) 1≤i≤n : 1 ≤ j ≤ } have non-zero support of length at most θ. Therefore, applying the orthogonal lattice attack from Section 4.2 on the encodings e j (i.e. on the vector ω = p zt · (e j ) 1≤j≤ mod x 0 ), we obtain a vector u ∈ Z such that u,m i · x i ≡ 0 (mod g i ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ θ, where them i 's are the vectors (m 1i , . . . , m i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ θ. Provided that x i ≡ 0 (mod g i ), this implies u,m i ≡ 0 (mod g i ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ θ. Therefore, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we can write j=1 u j m ji = k i g i for integers k i (and k i = 0 for θ + 1 ≤ i ≤ n). This gives:
and therefore y is a level-1 encoding of zero, moreover with small noise since the vector u is short. Note that we only need a single vector u; therefore the first step of the attack is proven by Proposition 5.
Second step: Cheon et al. attack. The second step consists in applying the Cheon et al. attack with the three sets A = {y · a j : 1 ≤ j ≤ n}, B = {b 0 , b 1 } and C = {c k : 1 ≤ k ≤ n}. Since y is an encoding of zero, all encodings in A are encodings of zero, and we can apply the Cheon et al. attack on the three sets A , B and C to recover all secret primes p i . Since the orthogonal lattice attack more generally provides a set of vectors u j ∈ Z (instead of a single u; and all satisfying u j ,m i ≡ 0 (mod g i ) for all i), a variant of the above attack with κ = 3 consists in starting from a set A = {a j : 1 ≤ j ≤ n} of = n encodings where only the first θ components of the underlying plaintexts are non-zero, and then generating a set A = { u j , a : 1 ≤ j ≤ n} of encodings of zero, with the vector of encodings a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ). One can then apply the Cheon et al. attack as previously on the three sets A , B and C.
Note that the first step of the attack above (i.e. the generation of encodings of zero) uses the orthogonal lattice attack from Section 4.2 with the bound αθ < ν. The attack from Section 4.3 is easily adapted to reach the improved bound αθ = O(ν 2 ). In this case the attacker can obtain · d level-two encodings of zero given by { u j , c k : 1 ≤ j ≤ , 1 ≤ k ≤ d} where c k is the vector of encodings (c j · c k ) 1≤j≤ with the encodings c j · c k considered in Section 4.3.
Application to constructions based on CLT13 with independent slots
In this section we show that our orthogonal lattice attack from Section 4 can be applied to various constructions over CLT13 multilinear maps with independent slots.
The multilinear subgroup elimination assumption from [GLW14,GLSW15]
The multilinear subgroup elimination assumption is used in [GLW14] for witness encryption and in [GLSW15] for constructing program obfuscation, based on a single assumption, independent of the particular circuit to be obfuscated. The multilinear subgroup elimination assumption is stated for a generic model of composite-order multilinear maps. Below, we show that our attacks break this assumption over CLT13 composite-order multilinear maps. We note that since the GLW14 scheme also includes encodings of zeroes, it could also be broken more directly by the Cheon et al. attack. We recall the definition from [GLSW15] .
Definition 7 ((µ, ν)-multilinear subgroup elimination assumption [GLSW15] ). Let G be a group of order N = a 1 · · · a µ b 1 · · · b ν c where a 1 , . . . , a µ , b 1 , . . . , b ν , c are µ + ν + 1 distinct primes. We give out generators x a 1 , . . . , x aµ , x b 1 , . . . , x bν for each prime order subgroup except for the subgroup of order c. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ µ, we also give out a group element h i sampled uniformly at random from the subgroup of order ca 1 · · · a i−1 a i+1 · · · a µ . The challenge term is a group element T ∈ G that is either sampled uniformly at random from the subgroup of order ca 1 · · · a µ or uniformly at random from the subgroup of order a 1 · · · a µ . The task is to distinguish between these two distributions of T .
For simplicity, we consider the assumption with µ = 1 and ν = 0; the generalization of our attack to any (µ, ν) is straightforward. Therefore G is a group of order a 1 c. The challenge T ∈ G is either generated at random from the subgroup of order a 1 c, or from the subgroup of order a 1 . In the context of a CLT13 instantiation, we assume that a 1 = θ i=1 g i and c = n i=θ+1 g i . In that case, a 1 and c are not primes, but the assumption can still be considered for composite a i 's, b i 's and c. The encoding T is then either generated from a random plaintext m ∈ n i=1 Z/g i Z, or from a random plaintext with only the θ first components non-zero, that is m ≡ 0 (mod g i ) for θ + 1 ≤ i ≤ n. It is easy to see that our attacks from Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 apply in this setting. Namely, when only the first θ components of the plaintext m corresponding to the challenge T are non-zero, our attacks recover the product a 1 = θ i=1 g i , whereas the attacks will fail when m is a random plaintext. Therefore the challenge T is easily distinguished unless θ is large enough; more precisely, θ must satisfy the bound given by (23) to prevent the attack.
The Zimmerman circuit obfuscation scheme
At Eurocrypt 2015, Zimmerman described a technique to obfuscate programs without matrix branching programs, based on composite-order multilinear maps [Zim15] . A plaintext m belongs to Z/N Z for a composite modulus N = N ev · N chk , and the ring Z/N Z is viewed as a direct product of an "evaluation" ring Z/N ev Z to evaluate the circuit, and a "checksum" ring Z/N chk Z to prevent the adversary from evaluating a different circuit; those two evaluations are performed in parallel. Using the CLT13 notations from Section 2, one can let N ev = θ i=1 g i and N chk = n i=θ+1 g i . In that case, the parameter θ must satisfy the bound given by (23) to prevent our lattice attack.
The FRS17 construction for preventing input partitioning attacks
At Asiacrypt 2017, Fernando, Rasmussen and Sahai described three constructions of "stamping functions" for preventing input-partitioning attacks on matrix branching programs [FRS17] . Their third construction is based on permutation hash functions and is instantiated over CLT13 multilinear maps with independent slots. More precisely, the permutation hash function is written as a matrix branching program, and multiple such permutation hash functions h i are evaluated in parallel along with the main matrix branching program; this is to ensure that only inputs of the form x h(x) can be evaluated, where h(x) = h 1 (x) · · · h t (x), which prevents input partitioning attacks.
Matrix branching programs. We first recall the construction of [GGH + 13b] to obfuscate matrix branching programs. A matrix branching program BP of length n p on -bit inputs x ∈ {0, 1} is evaluated by computing:
where {B i,b : 1 ≤ i ≤ n p , b ∈ {0, 1}} are 2n p square matrices and b 0 and b np+1 are bookend vectors; then BP(x) = 0 if C(x) = 0, and BP(x) = 1 otherwise. The integer inp(i) ∈ {1, . . . , } indicates which bit of x is read at step i of the product matrix computation. The matrices B i,b are first randomized by choosing n p + 1 random invertible matrices {R i : 0 ≤ i ≤ n p } and lettingB The resultingĈ(x) is then a last-level encoding that can be zero-tested to check if C(x) = 0, which reveals the output of the branching program BP(x), without revealing the matrices B i,b .
Application to the FRS17 construction. The [FRS17] scheme constructs a modified matrix branching program BP that receives as input u v 1 . . . v t and checks whether v i = h i (u) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t, where the h i 's are permutation hash functions; in that case, BP returns BP(u) where BP is the original branching program; otherwise, it returns some non-zero value. As explained in [FRS17] , multiple branching programs can be evaluated in parallel with composite order multilinear maps; with the countermeasure from [GLW14] over CLT13, each branching program is then evaluated modulo a product of θ of the primes g i 's, instead of a single g i in [FRS17] . It is easy to generate an input u v 1 . . . v t such that BP(u) = 0 and v i = h i (u) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t except for some i = i ; in that case, only one of the t + 1 parallel matrix branching program will evaluate to a non-zero value. The orthogonal lattice attack from Section 4.2 can therefore recover the secret plaintext ring n i=1 Z/g i Z of CLT13, under the condition αθ < ν. Alternatively, if multiple p zt 's are available, the extended attack from Section 4.3 applies under the condition αθ = O(ν 2 ), as described at the end of Section 4.3.
We note however that in both cases, our attack against [FRS17] only recovers the secret plaintext ring n i=1 Z/g i Z of CLT13, and not all secret parameters of CLT13; we leave that as an open problem.
